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Doctoral Thesis

Thesis Title: ‘Ignorance and Ethics in Stoic and Madhyamaka Philosophy’

Thesis Supervisors: Prof Simon Shogry (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford), Prof Jan Westerhoff (Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford)

Thesis Summary:

How do we act morally? We might think that the answer to this question lies in discovering a watertight ethical system that offers us a set of rules to follow. For ancient philosophers, the answer is not quite so simple. Drawing on Graeco-Roman Stoic and Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist thought, my work argues that acting ethically requires overhauling our entire set of beliefs and coming to see the world in radically new ways.

The Stoics claim that any action is the result of an agent’s judgement that this action is the appropriate one to perform. However, as I demonstrate in my thesis, what actions we deem to be appropriate is entirely pre-determined by our pre-existing beliefs. Moreover, for the Stoics, what makes an action appropriate is being in perfect accordance with our human nature and in alignment with the rationality of the cosmos. Yet most of us lack a proper understanding of these facts, so the Stoics think, which is why we fail to act correctly. Accordingly, our approach to ethics must focus on inculcating accurate views and nurturing the right dispositions in people.

The Mādhyamikas similarly hold that our unethical actions are the result of our ignorance. They see all actions as arising in an impersonal, mechanistic manner, as the product of an infinite series of prior causes. According to the standard reading, agents are therefore less responsible for their actions. However, as I argue in my thesis, this reading understates the Mādhyamikas’ radical metaphysical claim that there are no agents at all. Yet we might worry that ethical progress is impossible if there are no agents who can sufficiently control “their” actions. Fortunately, such worries can be allayed, I argue, by understanding how Mādhyamikas seek to reframe our approaches to ethical progress. We must move away from a model of individual agents intending to act better and towards one of identifying and eliminating the underlying causes that lead to unethical behaviour. The primary cause, all Mādhyamikas agree, is ignorance.

Consequently, my thesis concludes, for both Stoics and Mādhyamikas, we cannot just click our fingers and start making the right choices. Instead, right choices come at the end of a longterm project that involves changing how we see the world. Once we have done so, we do not need to try to act correctly; rather, right action will flow effortlessly. Philosophy thus leads to behavioural change not by giving us reasons to act one way or another, but by eliminating the mistaken beliefs that cause unethical action in the first place.

Future Research

Should we get angry at wrongdoers? We often see anger as a way of communicating that we have been victims of a moral violation. Many of us expect others to be angry at the wrongs of the world and perhaps even believe that without anger, they won’t be motivated to address those injustices. Yet we are also well aware that anger can easily lead to acrimony and violence, thereby perpetuating cycles of harm.

Despite the clear ethical dimensions of questions like these, discussions of anger are largely absent from modern normative ethics. For most ancient philosophers, on the other hand, the thought of doing ethics with a neglect of emotions such as anger would have seemed thoroughly misguided. In my future research project, I aim to bring these ideas into the modern world.

On the one hand, this monograph aims to address some of the interpretive issues in the literature on anger in ancient philosophy, with a particular focus on Aristotle, Stoicism and Buddhism. All three hold that anger is motivated by a perceived injustice and connected to a desire for revenge. Nevertheless, there is much scholarly debate on how exactly anger is connected to either of these. Is the judgment that one has been done wrong part of anger, or merely its cause? Is anger itself a desire for revenge, or does it prompt such a desire? Moreover, although these thinkers generally agree on what anger is, they strongly disagree on its role in our ethical life. Aristotle holds that a moderate degree of indignation motivates and emboldens us to confront wrongdoers, while the Stoics and Buddhists take any amount of anger to be ethically pernicious.

In considering these ancient views on anger, this project also seeks to offer new perspectives on anger within contemporary philosophy. It will engage with existing debates, particularly within feminist philosophy, about whether anger is an apt response to injustice. Aristotle (generally) agrees with this position, the Stoics and Buddhists disagree. Instead of getting angry, they think, we ought to focus on eliminating the causes of injustice, by recognising how wrongdoers are driven by psychological afflictions and misguided beliefs. At the same time, I also aim to highlight some further avenues for exploring anger within modern ethics more generally. Anger can serve as a recognition of unjust harms done to us as moral agents, but it can also prevent us from acknowledging the full humanity of those we deem to have wronged us. Accordingly, I contend, we ought to follow the guidance of ancient philosophers and make more space in our ethical thinking for emotions such as anger.

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